Are CEOs' purchases more profitable than they appear?
Christopher Armstrong, Terrence Blackburne, Phillip Quinn
| Year of publication: |
2021
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| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Blackburne, Terrence ; Quinn, Phillip |
| Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 71.2021, 2/3, p. 1-22
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| Subject: | CEO turnover | Incentive contracting | Insider trading | Private information | Signaling | Insiderhandel | Führungskräfte | Managers | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Signalling | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Rentabilität | Profitability | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101378 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012533581