Are ex ante CEO severance pay contracts consistent with efficient contracting?
Year of publication: |
June 2016
|
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Authors: | Cadman, Brian D. ; Campbell, John L. ; Klasa, Sandy |
Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0022-1090, ZDB-ID 219406-5. - Vol. 51.2016, 3, p. 737-769
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Abfindung | Redundancy pay | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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