Are Performance Conditions on Executive Options Driven by Fundamentals?

A special feature of UK executive pay is the heavy reliance on performance conditions for executive share options. Using data compiled from 2002-2003 Remuneration Committee reports of 130 of Britain's largest companies as well as linked data on analyst earnings forecasts and realised earnings, this paper computes probabilities of Britain's CEOs meeting their performance conditions and how much this varies across firms. Our main findings are that there is not much cross-company variation in how tough performance conditions are, though there are some outliers. We also find that the probability of meeting the targets depends on certain fundamental variables such as the number of non-executive directors, salaries of the chairs of the remcom committees, CEO tenure, CEO base pay and CEO notice periods. While most of the variables have the some sign as expected from theory, the statistical relations are weak. Overall, our results provide some support that good corporate governance leads to tougher targets for CEOs but at the some time the weakness of these links suggests that there is still much room for improvement