Assigning pollution permits : are uniform auctions efficient?
Francisco Alvarez, Cristina Mazón, Francisco Javier André
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Alvarez González, Francisco ; Mazón, Cristina ; André, Francisco Javier |
| Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 67.2019, 1, p. 211-248
|
| Subject: | Efficiency | Emission permits | Incomplete information simultaneous games | Uniform auction | Emissionshandel | Emissions trading | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Auktion | Auction | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Effizienz |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012040466