Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

MoreLess

Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Subject:	Sealed Bid Auctions \| Asymmetric Bidders \| Private-Independent Values \| Beliefs \| Experiments

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Papers on Strategic Interaction.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	6 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765211