Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms

We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Friedman, Eric J.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 1, p. 139-151
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Cost allocation \| Axioms \| Path mechanisms \| Incentives

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573661