Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection inMauritian Slave Auctions

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection.This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamicauction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformedbidders and higher prices when an informed participant is active. We conjecturethat observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior informationand nd a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicativeof information asymmetry.[...]

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2008-10-01
Authors:	Dionne, Georges ; St-Amour, Pascal ; Vencatachellum, Désiré
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| asmmetric informatin \| Adverse Selektion \| Sklaverei \| slavery

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

1 Introduction
2 Related literature
2.1 Asymmetric information and adverse selection
2.2 Adverse selection in slave markets
3 Theoretical analysis
3.1 An auction model with an informed bidder
3.2 A Monte-Carlo Experiment
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
4.2 Methodology
4.3 Results
4.4 From information asymmetry to adverse selection
5 Robustness checks
6 Conclusion
References
Appendix

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868840