Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to assess and disseminate the available stock among potential entrants.

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Authors:	Espinola-Arredondo, Ana ; Munoz-Garcia, Felix
Institutions:	School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
Subject:	Cost asymmetries \| Entry Deterrence \| Signaling \| Commons \| Welfare

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2013-8 10 pages
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Q5 - Environmental Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685316