Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Fibich, Gadi ; Gavious, Arieh
Published in:	European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 206.2010, 2, p. 496-507
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Asymmetric auctions Interdependent values Perturbation analysis Revenue equivalence

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494814