Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Mezzetti, Claudio |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Informationsversorgung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Auction Design | Interdependent Valuations | Generalized Revelation Principle | Efficiency |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 21.2003 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/118060 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.21 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions |
Source: |
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Mezzetti, Claudio, (2003)
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Mezzetti, Claudio, (2003)
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Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Benz, Eva, (2008)
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Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio, (2012)
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