Auction design with data-driven misspecifications : inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Jehiel, Philippe ; Mierendorff, Konrad |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 4, p. 1543-1579
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Subject: | analogy-based expectations | auctions | Belief formation | efficiency | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Auktion | Auction | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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