Auction theory
Vijay Krishna
| Year of publication: |
2010 ; 2. ed.
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Krishna, Vijay |
| Publisher: |
Amsterdam : Acad. Press |
| Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory | Auktion |
| Description of contents: | Table of Contents [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Table of Contents [external.dandelon.com] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] |
| Extent: | XI, 323 S. graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Description based upon print version of record ""Front Cover""; ""Title Page""; ""Copyright Page""; ""Dedication Page""; ""Table of Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction""; ""1.1 Some Common Auction Forms""; ""1.2 Valuations""; ""1.3 Equivalent Auctions""; ""1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency""; ""1.5 What Is an Auction?""; ""1.6 Outline of Part I""; ""Part I: Single-Object Auctions""; ""Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look""; ""2.1 The Symmetric Model""; ""2.2 Second-Price Auctions""; ""2.3 First-Price Auctions""; ""2.4 Revenue Comparison""; ""2.5 Reserve Prices""; ""Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle"" ""3.1 Main Result""""3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle""; ""3.2.1 Unusual Auctions""; ""3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders""; ""Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions""; ""4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders""; ""4.2 Budget Constraints""; ""4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions""; ""4.2.2 First-Price Auctions""; ""4.2.3 Revenue Comparison""; ""4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders""; ""4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders""; ""4.3.2 Revenue Comparison""; ""4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison""; ""4.4 Resale and Efficiency""; ""Chapter 5. Mechanism Design""; ""5.1 Mechanisms"" ""5.1.1 The Revelation Principle""""5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility""; ""5.1.3 Individual Rationality""; ""5.2 Optimal Mechanisms""; ""5.2.1 Setup""; ""5.2.2 Solution""; ""5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation""; ""5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms""; ""5.3 Efficient Mechanisms""; ""5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism""; ""5.3.2 Budget Balance""; ""5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade""; ""Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values""; ""6.1 The Symmetric Model""; ""6.2 Second-Price Auctions""; ""6.3 English Auctions""; ""6.4 First-Price Auctions""; ""6.5 Revenue Comparisons"" ""6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions""""6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions""; ""6.6 Efficiency""; ""Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage�) Principle""; ""7.1 The Main Result""; ""7.2 Public Information""; ""7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle""; ""Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications""; ""8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle""; ""8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions""; ""8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders""; ""8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees""; ""Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction"" ""9.1 The Single Crossing Condition""""9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions""; ""9.3 The Average Crossing Condition""; ""9.4 Three or More Bidders""; ""9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2""; ""9.6 Miscellany""; ""Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values""; ""10.1 Efficient Mechanisms""; ""10.2 Optimal Mechanisms""; ""Chapter 11. Bidding Rings""; ""11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions""; ""11.1.1 Efficient Collusion""; ""11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion""; ""11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions""; ""Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions"" ""Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions"" |
| ISBN: | 978-0-12-374507-1 ; 0-12-374507-1 ; 9786612285615 ; 978-0-08-092293-5 ; 978-0-12-374507-1 |
| Classification: | Methoden und Techniken der Volkswirtschaft ; Angewandte Mathematik ; Methoden und Techniken der Betriebswirtschaft |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012683106