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Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders

This paper shows the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in auctions with both common-value bidders and private-value ones. In equilibrium, the common-value bidders bid less aggressively when there are more private-value bidders. Further, resale is discussed as an application.
Year of publication:
2011
Authors: Tan, Xu ; Xing, Yiqing
Published in:
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 111.2011, 1, p. 99-103
Publisher: Elsevier
Keywords: Asymmetry Second-price auction Monotone equilibrium Resale
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Type of publication: Article
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866969
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