Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Year of publication: |
2013-06-18
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Auctions | signalling | mechanism design |
-
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn, (2013)
-
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Jun, Byoung Heon, (2013)
-
License auctions with royalty contracts for losers
Giebe, Thomas, (2006)
- More ...
-
Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction
Fan, Cuihong, (2014)
-
Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates
Fan, Cuihong, (2009)
-
Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
Fan, Cuihong, (2010)
- More ...