Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values

We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.

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Year of publication:	2003-08
Authors:	Fibich, Gadi ; Gavious, Arieh ; Sela, Aner
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	interdependent values \| perturbation analysis \| weakly assymetric auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 4009
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498078