Automobile insurance and driver ability : contract choice as a screening mechanism
Year of publication: |
September 2017
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Authors: | Posey, Lisa L. ; Thistle, Paul D. |
Published in: |
The Geneva risk and insurance review. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X, ZDB-ID 2197992-3. - Vol. 42.2017, 2, p. 141-170
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Subject: | asymmetric information | contracts | no-fault insurance | tort law | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kfz-Versicherung | Automobile insurance | Haftung | Liability | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vertrag | Contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragsrecht | Contract law | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Versicherung | Insurance |
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