Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts
Pierre Chaigneau
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
| Published in: |
Journal of business economics and management. - Vilnius : VTGU Press Technika, ISSN 1611-1699, ZDB-ID 2208925-1. - Vol. 16.2015, 4, p. 712-732
|
| Subject: | executive compensation | incentives | moral hazard | principal-agent | risk aversion | stock options | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktienoption | Stock option | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383053