Axiomatic Districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Puppe, Clemens ; Tasnádi, Attila
Subject:	Mathematics \| Econometrics

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Puppe, Clemens and Tasnádi, Attila (2010) Axiomatic Districting. Working Paper. .
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010124270