Axiomatizing core extensions

We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301–306, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">1979</CitationRef>; Sun et al. J Math Econ 44(7–8):853–860, <CitationRef CitationID="CR25">2008</CitationRef>) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg’s (J Math Econ 14(2):203–214, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">1985</CitationRef>) core axiomatization to the entire family of TU-games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012