Backward induction in games without perfect recall
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Hillas, John ; Kvasov, Dmitrij |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 124.2020, p. 207-218
|
Subject: | Extensive form games | Linear games | Perfect equilibrium | Perfect recall | Quasi-perfect equilibrium | Sequential equilibrium | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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