Bagwell's paradox, forward induction and outside option games

In Stackelberg-like games there is an advantage of moving first. However, Bagwell (1995) shows that this result may not hold if the second player can make only imperfect observations. We explore whether this paradox also holds when the advantage comes from forward induction arguments in the class of outside option games.

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Year of publication:	2010-12
Authors:	Ferreira, José Luis
Institutions:	Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Subject:	Bagwell's paradox \| Commitment \| Observability \| Noise \| Outside option games \| Forward induction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764904