Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences

Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues, are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Conde, Amparo M. Mármol ; Obiols, Clara Ponsatí
Institutions:	Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia
Subject:	Global bargaining \| maximin preferences \| leximin preferences

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number E2006/05 16 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187536