Bargaining Power Effects in Financial Contracting : A Joint Analysis of Contract Type and Placement Mode Choices

by Kai Rudolph

The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that a firm's financing decisions depend among other things on bargaining power considerations, and to illustrate potential causes for this dependency. Based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain over the financing of the firm's risky project, the author illustrates and analyzes the importance of bargaining power on finance decisions.

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Year of publication:	2006
Other Persons:	Rudolph, Kai (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject:	Finanzierungstheorie \| Financial management theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Verhandlungsmacht \| Bargaining power \| Agency-Theorie \| Finanztheorie
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [zbmath.org] ; Description [deposit.dnb.de]

Extent:	Online-Ressource (XVIII, 338 p. 25 illus, digital)
Series:	SpringerLink / Bücher
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Literaturverz. S. 319 - 328 Introduction; A Review of Related Research; A Model to Analyze Bargaining Power Effects; Extending the model by an Ex-ante Informational Asymmetry About Contractual Partners' Opportunities; Discussion of the Adopted Approach; Conclusion
ISBN:	978-3-540-34496-4 ; 978-3-540-34495-7
Other identifiers:	10.1007/3-540-34496-9 [DOI]
Classification:	Investition, Finanzierung ; Angewandte Mathematik
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013520557