Bargaining with partially revocable commitments: a simple model

Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. We examine the robustness of this result to the presence of a much more general class of commitments: partially revocable commitments.

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Year of publication:	2002-12-13
Authors:	Olcina, Gonzalo ; Cunyat, Antoni ; Calabuig, Vicent
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2002, 30, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629344