Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Correlated Equilibria
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nyarko, Y. |
Institutions: | C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of Economics |
Subject: | game theory | economic models |
-
Rubinstein, Ariel, (2012)
-
Comparative statics of a signalling game: an experimental study
Potters, J.J.M., (1996)
-
A Theory of stopping Time Games with Applications to Product Innovations and Asset Sales.
Dutta, P.K., (1991)
- More ...
-
The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games
Nyarko, Y., (1998)
-
Jovanovic, B., (1996)
-
The Savage-Bayesian Foundations of Economic Dynamics
Nyarko, Y., (1993)
- More ...