Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Suetens, Sigrid ; Potters, Jan
Published in:	Experimental Economics. - Springer, ISSN 1386-4157. - Vol. 10.2007, 1, p. 71-77
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Collusion \| Quantity-choice and price-choice experiments

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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