Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cnlogn steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1−e−c′n for some constant c′>0.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Babichenko, Yakov
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 81.2013, C, p. 130-144
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Anonymous games \| Best-reply dynamic \| Rate of convergence

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049881