Better safe than sorry? : CEO inside debt and risk-taking in bank acquisitions
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Srivastav, Abhishek ; Armitage, Seth ; Hagendorff, Jens ; King, Timothy |
Published in: |
Journal of financial stability. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089, ZDB-ID 2222049-5. - Vol. 36.2018, p. 208-224
|
Subject: | Banks | CEO incentives | Inside debt | Mergers and acquisitions | Übernahme | Takeover | Führungskräfte | Managers | Bank | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Anreiz | Incentives | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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