Between Complicity and Irrelevance? Industry Associations and the Challenge of Regulating Private Security Contractors

Discussions on regulation of private military and security companies have largely ignored the potential contribution of industry associations. This is the result of two factors: the preference for formal regulation, and the perception that industry associations in this field will not be able to rise above their trade-lobbyist aspect. This perception further suggests that industry associations, funded and, to a great extent managed by member companies, industry associations will either remain complicit in the activities of these member companies, or irrelevant to their control. This conclusion, however, ignores the actual functioning of these associations and their claims to legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness as regulatory bodies. This article takes these claims seriously, and explores the regulatory potential of industry associations in the security industry. It adopts the following structure. The introduction explores the reasons why their regulatory role remains unstudied. The first section begins to explore this role; piecing together an account of the history, structure, and regulatory mechanisms of three major associations. Such an account is thus far missing from literature, which has contributed to the neglect of their role. The next section situates industry-level regulation in the context of the status of private governance arrangements. This section explores legitimacy concerns arising out of the dual character of industry associations as regulatory bodies and trade groups, as also concerns peculiar to private provision of security services. It also critically examines the contribution of formal state regulation. The third section assesses the industry associations’ claims to legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness. Along with a critique, it offers suggestions for enhancement of these claims