Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely to have high ability.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Kawamura, Kohei ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 2, p. 240-243
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contest \| Selection \| Head start \| Favouritism

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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