Bid coordination in split-award procurement: The buyer need not know anything

Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Bag, Parimal Kanti ; Li, Jianpei
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 1, p. 143-146
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Split award \| Bid coordination \| Buyer information

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784973