Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited

We study network competition with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination in the presence of call externalities. We show that both the collusive and the welfare maximizing access charges fall below marginal cost. Moreover, bill-and-keep arrangements are welfare improving compared with cost-based access pricing.

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Year of publication:	2004-08-06
Authors:	Berger, Ulrich
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Access Charge \| Bill-and-Keep \| Call Externality \| Interconnection \| Telecommunications

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Industrial Organization.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10 10 pages
Classification:	L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L96 - Telecommunications
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412906