Board structure and institutional ownership at the time of IPO

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of mandatory regulatory provisions on board structure and the influence of such board structure on institutional holdings. Design/methodology/approach The study uses unique hand-collected data set of Indian IPOs during the 2004-2012 period after the corporate governance reforms with the introduction of clause 49 in the listing agreements in 2001. Using OLS regression, the paper empirically analyses the determinants of board size and board independence at the time of the IPOs and the influence of such a board structure on shareholdings by domestic and foreign institutional investors. Findings The authors find that complying with mandatory regulatory provisions does not impede firms from structuring their boards to reflect the firms’ advising and monitoring needs. The authors also find that complying with provisions have positive implication for the firm, as firms with greater board independence appear to attract more foreign institutional investors. Originality/value To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue in a regime where regulation mandates the composition of the board of directors. The paper also extends the literature on institutional holdings by providing evidence on the impact of board structure on institutional ownership at a critical time in a firm’s life cycle when concerns for endogeneity for empirical investigations are weaker.