BOCOG's outsourcing contracts: The vendor's perspective
To date, most research on outsourcing is modeled from the client's perspective. In this paper, we approach the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) outsourcing contracts from the vendors' perspective. Since a vendor always has the option to accept or not accept an outsourcing contract, we use the theory of options to analyze the vendor's decision making, i.e., the trigger point, which coincides with the optimal profit level, of the vendor's decision to pursue an outsourcing contract. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model and its potential benefits for vendors' decision making.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jiang, Bin ; Reinhardt, Gilles ; Young, Scott T. |
Published in: |
Omega. - Elsevier, ISSN 0305-0483. - Vol. 36.2008, 6, p. 941-949
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Decision making/process Bidding Optimization |
Saved in:
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