Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages : an experimental study on forward induction
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Huck, Steffen ; Müller, Wieland |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 51.2005, 1, p. 109-127
|
Subject: | Experiment | Geld | Money | Theorie | Theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Normalformspiel | Normal-form game | Koordination | Coordination |
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