“Buying a pig in a poke”:An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.

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Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, Maria Vittoria ; Ockenfels, Axel ; Weiland, Torsten
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung für Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung \| Experimental Economics \| Fairness \| Diktator \| dictator \| Vetorecht \| Veto power

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1. Introduction and experimental procedures
2. First mover behavior
3. Second mover behavior
4. Conclusions

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866673