Calculating upper and lower probability bounds on the outcomes of large entry games
Recently developed econometric techniques for estimating the parameters of entry games with multiple equilibria suffer significant computational constraints associated with calculating upper and lower bound entry probabilities. We provide simulation-based and analytical expressions for these probabilities, reducing this computational burden.
Year of publication: |
2010
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---|---|
Authors: | Cohen, Andrew |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 3, p. 324-326
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Entry games Multiple equilibria Nash equilibrium Modified minimum distance estimators |
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