Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? : the role of pro-social preferences
Year of publication: |
January 2018
|
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Authors: | Biener, Christian ; Eling, Martin ; Landmann, Andreas ; Pradhan, Shailee |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 101.2018, p. 230-249
|
Subject: | Experiment | Group joint liability | Moral hazard | Pro-social preferences | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Altruismus | Altruism | Soziales Verhalten | Social behaviour | Haftung | Liability | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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