Can incentive-based spatial management work in the Eastern tuna and billfish fishery?

The Eastern tuna and billfish fishery (ETBF) is currently managed through an input quotasystem based on individual transferable effort units (the number of hooks) and a totalallowable effort level (i.e. total number of hooks) A spatial management policy based on aseries of differential hook-penalties has been proposed as a flexible tool to discourage vesselsoperating in certain areas (e.g. those with high bycatch potential) and encourage operating inother areas (e.g. with less bycatch potential). In this study, the importance of catch rates perhook to location choice is assessed through the estimation of a nested multinomial logitmodel. Other variables in the model include distance to the location, prices of the mainspecies, fuel prices and vessel characteristics. The effects of increasing hook penalties in keyareas on fishing effort in those areas and elsewhere are assessed. Implications for vesseleconomic performance are also assessed.