Can management-sponsored non-binding remuneration votes shape the executive compensation structure? : evidence from Say-on-Pay votes in Germany
Jörn Obermann
| Year of publication: |
2018
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Obermann, Jörn |
| Published in: |
The European journal of finance. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1351-847X, ZDB-ID 1282412-4. - Vol. 24.2018, 17, p. 1609-1630
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| Subject: | entrenchment | executive compensation | remuneration vote | Say-on-Pay | shareholder activism | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Deutschland | Germany | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Lohn | Wages |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1080/1351847X.2017.1419982 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012259090