Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows?

In an economy a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows

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Year of publication:	[2005]
Authors:	Cordella, Tito
Publisher:	[2005]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Series:	IMF Working Paper ; No. 98/131
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 1998 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.139633 [DOI]
Classification:	F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-Term Capital Movements ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012737725