Can the leniency program deter collusion in young competition jurisdiction of transition economy?
Year of publication: |
2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jusupova, Gjuzelʹ |
Published in: |
International journal of economic policy in emerging economies. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises, ISSN 1752-0452, ZDB-ID 2449908-0. - Vol. 10.2017, 4, p. 383-406
|
Subject: | collusion | transition economy | competition jurisdiction | indicator of collusion sustainability | Federal Antimonopoly Service | FAS | enforcement of antitrust provisions against collusion | hard-core cartels | collusion duration | number of participants of collusion discoveries | leniency program | antitrust legislation in Russia | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Kartell | Cartel | Theorie | Theory | Russland | Russia | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Systemtransformation | Economic transition | Wettbewerbsrecht | Competition law | Preiskartell | Price-fixing cartel |
-
The model of criminal activity and effective cartel deterrence
Klimašauskienė, Danguolė, (2014)
-
Leniency Program and Cartel Deterrence in Russia : Effects Assessment
Yusupova, Gyuzel, (2013)
-
Leniency programs and cartel organization of multiproduct firms
Dargaud, Emilie, (2020)
- More ...
-
Programma osvoboždenija ot nakazanija v antimonopolʹnoj politike : problemy ėmpiričeskoj ocenki
Jusupova, Gjuzelʹ, (2013)
-
FAS protiv Google : ėkonomičeskij analiz dlja osobych rynkov
Jusupova, Gjuzelʹ, (2016)
-
Byl li molčalivyj sgovor? : ešče raz o monopolʹno vysokich cenach rossijskich neftjanych kompanij
Jusupova, Gjuzelʹ, (2015)
- More ...