Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks
Optimizing banks subject to runs are introduced in a macro model to study the transmission of monetary policy and its interplay with bank capital regulation when banks are risky. A monetary expansion and a positive productivity shock increase bank leverage and risk. Risk-based capital requirements amplify the cycle and are welfare detrimental. Within a class of simple policy rules, the best combination includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios (as in Basel III) and a response of monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Angeloni, Ignazio ; Faia, Ester |
Published in: |
Journal of Monetary Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932. - Vol. 60.2013, 3, p. 311-324
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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