Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information

We study asymmetric all-pay auctions where two privately informed agents bid for a prize. We show that capping the bids is profitable for a designer who wants to maximize the sum of bids (revenue). This finding confims the results of Che and Gale (1998) in the context of incomplete information and completes the analysis of Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) by analyzing the case of ex-ante asymmetric players.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Sahuguet, Nicolas
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2006, 9, p. 1-8
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	All-pay auctions

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110720