Cash holdings and CEO risk incentive compensation : effect of CEO risk aversion
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Feng, Harry ; Rao, Ramesh P. |
| Published in: |
International review of financial analysis. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1057-5219, ZDB-ID 1133622-5. - Vol. 60.2018, p. 162-176
|
| Subject: | Cash holdings | CEO compensation | Managerial risk aversion | Risk incentives | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Aktienoption | Stock option | Risiko | Risk | Theorie | Theory | Cash-Management | Cash management |
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