Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-10-25
Authors:	Azrieli, Yaron
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Random-matching game \| Categorization \| Correlated equilibrium

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837081