Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty : substitutes or complements?

Carsten Hefeker; Blandine Zimmer

This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity. -- Central bank independence ; Conservatism ; Transparency of monetary policy

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Hefeker, Carsten ; Zimmer, Blandine
Publisher:	Siegen : Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Subject:	Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion \| Zentralbankunabhängigkeit \| Central bank independence \| Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit \| Decision under uncertainty \| Politische Kommunikation \| Political communication \| Neoklassische Synthese \| Neoclassical synthesis \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (15 S.)
Series:	Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge. - Siegen, ISSN 1869-0211, ZDB-ID 2148236-6. - Vol. 140
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/41088 [Handle]
Classification:	E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944807