Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence
John Duffy, Frank Heinemann
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Duffy, John ; Heinemann, Frank |
| Published in: |
Journal of monetary economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932, ZDB-ID 191155-7. - Vol. 117.2021, p. 887-903
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| Subject: | Monetary policy | Central banking | Cheap talk | Commitment | Discretion | Experimental Economics | Repeated games | Time inconsistency | Transparency | Geldpolitik | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Zentralbank | Central bank | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experiment | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.06.006 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603276