CEO Compensation Mix and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Bias

We investigate the relation between the proportion of total compensation received by CEOs from stock options and the accuracy and bias of analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that forecast accuracy decreases as the proportion of stock option pay increases. Higher proportions of stock options induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, to manipulate accounting earnings, and to make opportunistic voluntary disclosures, resulting in an increase in the complexity of forecasting. We also examine the relation between forecast bias and the proportion of stock option pay. Analysts' optimistic forecast bias increases as the proportion of stock option pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock option pay, analysts, needing greater access to management's information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts' earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the proportion of CEO compensation from stock options increases, even after controlling for previously identified determinants of forecasting difficulty