CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?
Year of publication: |
2011-05-05
|
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Authors: | Cronqvist, Henrik ; Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger |
Institutions: | National Centre of Competence in Research - Financial Valuation and Risk Management |
Subject: | Vergütung | payment | Kontrakttheorie | Leveraged Buyout | Vorstand |
Extent: | 403456 bytes 45 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Ergonomic job analysis ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
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